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Abstract
Priced timed games are optimal-cost reachability games played between two players—the controller
and the environment—by moving a token along the edges of infinite graphs of configurations of
priced timed automata. The goal of the controller is to reach a given set of target locations as
cheaply as possible, while the goal of the environment is the opposite. Priced timed games are
known to be undecidable for timed automata with 3 or more clocks, while they are known to be
decidable for automata with 1 clock. In an attempt to recover decidability for priced timed games
Bouyer, Markey, and Sankur studied robust priced timed games where the environment has the
power to slightly perturb delays proposed by the controller. Unfortunately, however, they showed
that the natural problem of deciding the existence of optimal limit-strategy—optimal strategy of
the controller where the perturbations tend to vanish in the limit—is undecidable with 10 or more
clocks. In this paper we revisit this problem and improve our understanding of the decidability
of these games. We show that the limit-strategy problem is already undecidable for a subclass of
robust priced timed games with 5 or more clocks. On a positive side, we show the decidability of
the existence of almost optimal strategies for the same subclass of one-clock robust priced timed
games by adapting a classical construction by Bouyer at al. for one-clock priced timed games.
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2 Revisiting Robustness in Priced Timed Games
1 Introduction
Two-player zero-sum games on priced timed automata provide a mathematically elegant mod-
eling framework for the control-program synthesis problem in real-time systems. In these
games, two players—the controller and the environment—move a token along the edges of
the infinite graph of configurations of a timed automaton to construct an infinite execution of
the automaton in order to optimize a given performance criterion. The optimal strategy of the
controller in such game then corresponds to control-program with the optimal performance.
By priced timed games (PTGs) we refer to such games on priced timed automata with optimal
reachability-cost objective. The problem of deciding the existence of the optimal controller
strategy in PTGs is undecidable [8] with 3 or more clocks, while it is known to be decidable [5]
for automata with 1 clock. Also, the ε-optimal strategies can be computed for priced timed
games under the non-Zeno assumption [1, 4]. Unfortunately, however, the optimal controller
strategies obtained as a result of solving games on timed automata may not be physically
realizable due to unrealistic assumptions made in the modeling using timed automata, re-
garding the capability of the controller in enforcing precise delays. This severely limits the
application of priced timed games in control-program synthesis for real-time systems.
In order to overcome this limitation, Bouyer, Markey, and Sankur [7] argued the need for
considering the existence of robust optimal strategies and introduced two different robustness
semantics—excess and conservative—in priced timed games. The key assumption in their
modeling is that the controller may not be able to apply an action at the exact time delays
suggested by the optimal strategy. This phenomenon is modeled as a perturbation game where
the time delay suggested by the controller can be perturbed by a bounded quantity. Notice
that such a perturbation may result in the guard of the corresponding action being disabled.
In the conservative semantics, it is the controller’s responsibility to make sure that the guards
are satisfied after the perturbation. On the other hand, in the excess semantics, the controller
is supposed to make sure that the guard is satisfied before the perturbation: an action can
be executed even when its guard is disabled (“excess”) post perturbation and the valuations
post perturbation will be reflected in the next state. The game based characterization for ro-
bustness in timed automata under “excess” semantics was first proposed by Bouyer, Markey,
and Sankur [6] where they study the parameterized robust (qualitative) reachability prob-
lem and show it to be EXPTIME-complete. The “conservative” semantics were studied for
reachability and Büchi objectives in [13] and shown to be PSPACE-complete. For a detailed
survey on robustness in timed setting we refer to an excellent survey by Markey [11].
Bouyer, Markey, and Sankur [7] showed that the problem for deciding the existence of
the optimal strategy is undecidable for priced timed games with 10 or more clocks under the
excess semantics. In this paper we further improve the understanding of the decidability of
these games. However, to keep the presentation simple, we restrict our attention to turn-based
games under excess semantics. To further generalize the setting, we permit both positive and
negative price rates with the restriction that the accumulated cost in any cycle is non-negative
(akin to the standard no-negative-cycle restriction in shortest path game problems on finite
graphs). We improve the undecidability result of [7] by proving that optimal reachability
remains undecidable for robust priced timed automata with 5 clocks. Our second key result
is that, for a fixed δ, the cost optimal reachability problem for one clock priced timed games
with no-negative-cycle restriction is decidable for robust priced timed games with given bound
on perturbations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first decidability result known
for robust timed games under the excess semantics. A closely related result is [9], where
decidability is shown for robust timed games under the conservative semantics for a fixed δ.
2 Preliminaries
We write R for the set of reals and Z for the set of integers. Let C be a finite set of real-valued
variables called clocks. A valuation on C is a function ν : C → R. We assume an arbitrary
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but fixed ordering on the clocks and write xi for the clock with order i. This allows us to
treat a valuation ν as a point (ν(x1), ν(x2), . . . , ν(xn)) ∈ R|C|. Abusing notations slightly,
we use a valuation on C and a point in R|C| interchangeably. For a subset of clocks X ⊆ C
and valuation ν ∈ R|C|, we write ν[X:=0] for the valuation where ν[X:=0](x) = 0 if x ∈ X,
and ν[X:=0](x) = ν(x) otherwise. The valuation 0 ∈ R|C| is a special valuation such that
0(x) = 0 for all x ∈ C. A clock constraint over C is a subset of R|C|. We say that a constraint
is rectangular if it is a conjunction of a finite set of constraints of the form x ./ k, where
k ∈ Z, x ∈ C, and ./∈ {<,≤,=, >,≥}. For a constraint g ∈ ϕ(C), we write [[g]] for the set of
valuations in R|C| satisfying g. We write ϕ(C) for the set of rectangular constraints over C.
We use the terms constraints and guards interchangeably.
Following [5] we introduce priced timed games with external cost function on target loc-
ations (see Appendix A). For this purpose, we define a cost function[5] as a piecewise affine
continuous function f : Rn≥0 → R ∪ {+∞,−∞}. We write F for the set of all cost functions.
I Definition 1 (Priced Timed Games). A turn-based two player priced timed game is a tuple
G = (L1, L2, Linit, C, X, η, T, fgoal) where Li is a finite set of locations of Player i, Linit ⊆
L1 ∪ L2(let L1 ∪ L2 = L) is a set of initial locations, C is an (ordered) set of clocks, X ⊆
L × ϕ(C) × 2C × (L ∪ T ) is the transition relation, η : L → Z is the price function, T is the
set of target locations, T ∩L = ∅; and fgoal : T → F assigns external cost functions to target
locations.
We refer to Player 1 as the controller and Player 2 as the environment. A priced timed game
begins with a token placed on some initial location ` with valuation 0 and cost accumulated
being so far being 0. At each round, the player who controls the current location ` chooses a
delay t (to be elapsed in l) and an outgoing transition e = (`, g, r, `′) ∈ X to be taken after t
delay at `. The clock valuation is then updated according to the delay t, the reset r, the cost
is incremented by η(`) · t and the token is moved to the location `′. The two players continue
moving the token in this fashion, and give rise to a sequence of locations and transitions called
a play of the game. A configuration or state of a PTG is a tuple (`, ν, c) where ` ∈ L is a
location, ν ∈ R|C| is a valuation, and c is the cost accumulated from the start of the play. We
assume, w.l.o.g [2], that the clock valuations are bounded.
I Definition 2 (PTG semantics). The semantics of a PTG G is a labelled state-transition
game arena [[G]] = (S = S1 unionmulti S2, Sinit, A,E, pi, κ) where
Sj = Lj × R|C| are the Player j states with S = S1 unionmulti S2,
Sinit ⊆ S are initial states s.t. (`, ν) ∈ Sinit if ` ∈ Linit, ν = 0,
A = R≥0 ×X is the set of timed moves,
E : (S × A) → S is the transition function s.t. for s = (`, ν), s′ = (`′, ν′)∈S and τ =
(t, e) ∈ A the function E(s, τ) is defined if e = (`, g, r, `′) is a transition of the PTG and
ν ∈ [[g]]; moreover E(s, τ) = s′ if ν′ = (ν + t)[r:=0] (we write s τ−→ s′ when E(s, τ) = s′);
pi : S ×A→ R is the price function such that pi((`, ν), (t, e)) = η(`) · t; and
κ : S → R is an external cost function such that κ(`, ν) is defined when ` ∈ T such that
κ(`, ν) = fgoal(`)(ν).
A play ρ = 〈s0, τ1, s1, τ2, . . . , sn〉 is a finite sequence of states and actions s.t. s0 ∈ Sinit
and si
τi+1−−−→ si+1 for all 0 ≤ i < n. The infinite plays are defined in an analogous manner.
For a finite play ρ we write its last state as last(ρ) = sn. For a (infinite or finite) play ρ
we write stop(ρ) for the index of first target state and if it doesn’t visit a target state then
stop(ρ) =∞. We denote the set of plays as PlaysG . For a play ρ = 〈s0, (t1, a1), s1, (t2, a2), . . .〉
if stop(ρ) = n <∞ then CostG(ρ) = κ(sn) +
∑n
j=1 pi(si−1, (ti, ai)) else CostG(ρ) = +∞.
A strategy of player j in G is a function σ : PlaysG → A such that for a play ρ the function
σ(ρ) is defined if last(ρ) ∈ Sj . We say that a strategy σ is memoryless if σ(ρ) = σ(ρ′) when
last(ρ) = last(ρ′), otherwise we call it memoryful. We write Strat1 and Strat2 for the set of
strategies of player 1 and 2, respectively.
A play ρ is said to be compatible to a strategy σ of player j ∈ {1, 2} if for every state si in
ρ that belongs to Player j, si+1 = σ(si). Given a pair of strategies (σ1, σ2) ∈ Strat1 × Strat2,
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and a state s, the outcome of (σ1, σ2) from s denoted Outcome(s, σ1, σ2) is the unique play
that starts at s and is compatible with both strategies. Given a player 1 strategy σ1 ∈ Strat1
we define its cost CostG(s, σ1) as supσ2∈Strat2(Cost(Outcome(s, σ1, σ2))). We now define the
optimal reachability-cost for Player 1 from a state s as
OptCostG(s) = inf
σ1∈Strat1
sup
σ2∈Strat2
(Cost(Outcome(s, σ1, σ2))).
A strategy σ1 ∈ Strat1 is said to be optimal from s if CostG(s, σ1) = OptCostG(s). Since the
optimal strategies may not always exist [5] we define  optimal strategies. For  > 0 a strategy
σ ∈ Strat1 is called -optimal if OptCostG(s) ≤ CostG(s, σ) < OptCostG(s)+ . Given a PTG
G and a bound K ∈ Z, the cost-optimal reachability problem for PTGs is to decide whether
there exists a strategy for player 1 such that OptCostG(s) ≤ K from some starting state s.
I Theorem 3 ([3]). Cost-optimal reachability problem is undecidable for PTGs with 3 clocks.
I Theorem 4 ([5, 10, 12]). The -optimal strategy is computable for 1 clock PTGs.
3 Robust Semantics
Under the robust semantics of priced timed games the environment player—also called as
the perturbator—is more privileged as it has the power to perturb any delay chosen by the
controller by an amount in [−δ, δ], where δ > 0 is a pre-defined bounded quantity. However,
in order to ensure time-divergence there is a restriction that the time delay at all locations of
the RPTG must be ≥ δ. There are the following two perturbation semantics as defined in [7].
Excess semantics. At any controller location, the time delay t chosen by the controller
is altered to some t′ ∈ [t − δ, t + δ] by the perturbator. However, the constraints on
the outgoing transitions of the controller locations are evaluated with respect to the time
elapse t chosen by the controller. If the constraint is satisfied with respect to t, then the
values of all variables which are not reset on the transition are updated with respect to
t′; the variables which are reset obtain value 0.
Conservative semantics. In this, the constraints on the outgoing transitions are evaluated
with respect to t′.
In both semantics, the delays chosen by perturbator at his locations are not altered, and the
constraints on outgoing transitions are evaluated in the usual way, as in PTG.
A Robust-Priced Timed Automata (RPTA) is an RPTG which has only controller loc-
ations. At all these locations, for any time delay t chosen by controller, perturbator can
implicitely perturb t by a quantity in [−δ, δ]. The excess as well as the conservative per-
turbation semantics for RPTA are defined in the same way as in the RPTG. Note that our
RPTA coincides with that of [7] when the cost functions at all target locations are of the form
cf : Rn≥0 → {0}. Our RPTG are turn-based, and have cost funtions at the targets, while
RPTGs studied in [7] are concurrent.
I Definition 5 (Excess Perturbation Semantics). Let R = (L1, L2, Linit, C, X, η, T, fgoal) be
a RPTG. Given a δ > 0, the excess perturbation semantics of RPTG R is a LTS [[R]] =
(S, A,E) where S = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ (T × R≥0), A = A1 ∪A2 and E = E1 ∪ E2. We define the set
of states, actions and transitions for each player below.
S1 = L1 × R|C| are the controller states,
S2 = (L2×R|C|)∪ (S1×R≥0×X) are the perturbator states. The first kind of states are
encountered at perturbator locations. The second kind of states are encountered when
controller chooses a delay t ∈ R≥0 and a transition e ∈ X at a controller location.
A1 = R≥0 ×X are controller actions
A2 = (R≥0×X)∪ [−δ, δ] are perturbator actions. The first kind of actions (R≥0×X) are
chosen at states of the form L2 × R|C| ∈ S2, while the second kind of actions are chosen
at states of the form S1 × R≥0 ×X ∈ S2,
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E1 = (S1 × A1 × S2) is the set of controller transitions such that for a controller state
(l, ν) and a controller action (t, e), E1((l, ν), (t, e)) is defined iff there is a transition e =
(l, g, a, r, l′) in R such that ν + t ∈ [[g]].
E2 = S2 ×A2 × (S1 ∪ S2 ∪ (T × R≥0)) is the set of perturbator transitions such that
For a perturbator state of the type (l, ν) and a perturbator action (t, e), we have
(l′, ν′) = E2((l, ν), (t, e)) iff there is a transition e = (l, g, a, r, l′) in R such that ν + t ∈
[[g]], ν′ = (ν + t)[r := 0],
For a perturbator state of type ((l, ν), t, e) and a perturbator action ε ∈ [−δ, δ], we have
(l′, ν′) = E2(((l, ν), t, e), ε) iff e = (l, g, a, r, l′), and ν′ = (ν + t+ ε)[r := 0].
We now define the cost of the transitions, denoted as Cost(t, e) as follows :
For controller transitions : (l, ν) (t,e)−−−→ ((l, ν), t, e) : the cost accumulated is Cost(t, e) = 0.
For perturbator transitions :
From perturbator states of type (l, ν) : (l, ν) t,e−−→ (l′, ν′), the cost accumulated is
Cost(t, e) = t ∗ η(l).
From perturbator states of type ((l, ν), t, e) : ((l, ν), t, e) ε−→ (l′, ν′), the cost accumulated
is (t+ ε) ∗ η(l). Note that although this transition has no edge choice involved and the
perturbation delay chosen is ε ∈ [−δ, δ], the controller action (t, e) chosen in the state
(l, ν) comes into effect in this transition. Hence for the sake of uniformity, we denote
the cost accumulated in this transition to be Cost(t+ ε, e) = (t+ ε) ∗ η(l).
Note that we check satisfiability of the constraint g before the perturbation; however, the
reset occurs after the perturbation. The notions of a path and a winning play are the
same as in PTG. We shall now adapt the definitions of cost of a play, and a strategy
for the excess perturbation semantics. Let ρ = 〈s1, (t1, e1), s2, (t2, e2), · · · (tn−1, en−1), sn〉
be a path in the LTS [[R]]. Given a δ > 0, for a finite play ρ ending in target loca-
tion, we define CostδR(ρ) =
∑n
i=1 Cost(ti, ei) + fgoal(ln)(νn) as the sum of the costs of all
transitions as defined above along with the value from the cost function of the target loc-
ation ln. Also, we re-define the cost of a strategy σ1 from a state s for a given δ > 0 as
CostδR(s, σ1) = supσ2∈Strat2(R) Cost
δ
R(Outcome(s, σ1, σ2)). Similarly, OptCostδR is the optimal
cost under excess perturbation semantics for a given δ > 0 defined as
OptCostδR(s) = inf
σ1∈Strat1(R)
sup
σ2∈Strat2(R)
(CostδR(Outcome(s, σ1, σ2))).
Since optimal strategies may not always exist, we define −optimal strategies such that for
every  > 0, OptCostδR(s) ≤ CostδR(s, σ1) < OptCostδR(s) + . Given a δ and a RPTG R
with a single clock x, a strategy σ1 is called (,N)−acceptable [5] for  > 0, N ∈ N when
(1)it is memoryless, (2)it is −optimal and (3)there exist N consecutive intervals (Ii)1≤i≤N
partitioning [0, 1] such that for every location l, for every 1≤i≤N and every integer α < M
(whereM is the maximum bound on the clock value), the function that maps the clock values
ν(x) to the cost of the strategy σ1 at every state (l, ν(x)), (ν(x) 7→ CostδR((l, ν(x)), σ1)) is
affine for every interval α+ Ii. Also, the strategy σ1 is constant over the values α+ Ii at all
locations, that is, when ν(x) ∈ α+ Ii, the strategy σ1(l, ν(x)) is constant. The number N is
an important attribute of the strategy as it establishes that the strategy does not fluctuate
infinitely often and is implementable.
Now, we shall define limit variations of costs, strategies and values as δ → 0. The limit-
cost of a controller strategy σ1 from state s is defined over all plays ρ starting from s that
are compatible with σ1 as:
LimCostR(s, σ1) = lim
δ→0
sup
σ2∈Strat2(R)
CostδR(Outcome(s, σ1, σ2)).
The limit strategy upper-bound problem [7] for excess perturbation semantics asks, given a
RPTG R, state s = (l,0) with cost 0 and a rational number K, whether there exists a
strategy σ1 such that LimCostR(s, σ1) ≤ K. The following are the main results of [7].
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(Non-)Negative Cycles
-1
x < 1
1
-1
x < 1
1
0
x < 1
x := 0
x < 1
x = 1
y := 0
x < 1
y = 0
x = 1, y = 0
x := 0
I Theorem 6 (Known results [7]). 1. The limit-strategy upper-bound problem is unde-
cidable for RPTA and RPTG under excess perturbation semantics, for ≥ 10 clocks.
2. For a fixed δ ∈ [0, 13 ], and a given RPTA A, a target location l and a rational K, it is
undecidable whether infσ1 supσ2 costσ1,σ2(ρ) < K such that ρ ends in l. costσ1,σ2(ρ)
is the cost of the unique run ρ obtained from the pair of strategies (σ1, σ2).
We consider a semantic subclass of RPTGs in which the accumulated cost of any cycle
is non-negative: that is, any iteration of a cycle will always have a non-negative cost.
Consider the two cycles depicted. The one on top has a non-negative cost, while the one
below always has a negative cost. In the cycle below, the perturbator will not perturb,
since that will lead to a target state. In the rest of the paper, we consider this semantic class
of RPTGs (RPTAs), and prove decidability and undecidability results; however, we will refer
to them as RPTGs(RPTAs). Our key contributions are the following theorems.
I Theorem 7. The limit-strategy upper-bound problem is undecidable for RPTA with 5 clocks,
location prices in {0, 1}, and cost functions cf : Rn≥0 → {0} at all target locations.
I Theorem 8. Given a 1-clock RPTG R and a δ > 0, we can compute OptCostδR(s) for
every state s = (l, ν). For every  > 0, there exists an N ∈ N such that the controller has an
(,N)-acceptable strategy.
The rest of the paper is devoted to the proof sketches of these two theorems, while we give
detailed proofs in the appendix.
4 Undecidability with 5 clocks
In this section, we improve the result of [7] by showing that the limit strategy upper bound
problem is undecidable for robust priced timed automata with 5 or more clocks. The undecid-
ability result is obtained using a reduction to the halting problem of two-counter machines.
A two-counter machine has counters C1 and C2, and a list of instructions I1, I2, . . . , In,
where In is the halt instruction. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1, Ii is one of the following instructions:
increment cb: cb := cb + 1; goto Ij , for b = 1 or 2, decrement cb with zero test:
if (cb = 0) goto Ij else cb := cb − 1; goto Ij , where c1, c2 represent the counter values.
The initial values of both counters are 0. Given the initial configuration (I1, 0, 0) the halting
problem for two counter machines is to find if the configuration (In, c1, c2) is reachable, with
c1, c2 ≥ 0. This problem is known to be undecidable.
We simulate the two counter machine using a RPTA with 5 clocks x1, z, x2, y1 and y2
under the excess perturbation semantics. The counters are encoded in clocks x1 and z as
x1 = 12i + ε1 and z =
1
2j + ε2 where i, j are respectively the values of counters C1, C2, and ε1
and ε2 denote accumulated values due to possible perturbations. Clocks x2, y1 and y2 help
with the rough work. The simulation is achieved as follows: for each instruction, we have
a module simulating it. Upon entering the module, the clocks are in their normal form i.e.
x1 = 12i + ε1, z =
1
2j + ε2 and x2 = 0 and y1 = y2 = 0.
4.1 Increment module
The module in Figure 1 simulates the increment of counter C1. The value of counter C2
remains unchanged since the value of clock z remains unchanged at the exit from the module.
Upon entering A the clock values are x1 = 12i + ε1, z =
1
2j + ε2, x2 = y1 = y2 = 0. Here ε1
and ε2 respectively denote the perturbations accumulated so far. We denote by α, the value
of clock x1, i.e. 12i + ε1. Thus at A, the delay is 1 − α. Note that the dashed edges are
unperturbed (this is a short hand notation. A small gadget that implements this is described
in Appendix B), so x1 = 1 on entering B. No time elapse happens at B, and at C, controller
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0
A
0
B
0
C
0
D
mChoice 0
E
RestoreC1C2Inc
RestoreC2C1Inc
0
F
x2=0
{y2}
x1=1
{x2}
x2=0
{x1}
x1≤1
{x1}
y1=1
{y2}
y1=0
{x2, y2}
y1=
0
y1=0
y1=0
y1=
0
Choice Test IncC1<
y1=0
y1=0
Test IncC1>
1
A′
0
B′
1
C ′
1
D′
0
y1=0x1=7
{x1}
x2=8x1=1
{x1}
x1=1
Figure 1 Increment C1 module : The module keeps the fractional part of the clock z un-
changed. The dashed edges represent unperturbed edges (detailed in Appendix B).
chooses a delay t. This t must be α2 to simulate the increment correctly. t can be perturbed
by an amount δ by the perurbator, where δ can be both positive or negative, obtaining
x2 = t+ δ, x1 = 0, y1 = 1− α + t+ δ on entering D. At D, the delay is α − t− δ. Thus the
total delay from the entry point A in this module to the mChoice module is 1 time unit. At
the entry of the mChoice (mChoice and Restore modules are in Appendix B) module, the
clock values are x1 = α− t− δ, z = 1 + 12j + ε2, x2 = α, y1 = 1, y2 = 0. To correctly simulate
the increment of C1, t should be exactly α2 .
At the mChoice module, perturbator can either continue the simulation (by going through
the Restore module) or verify the correctness of controller’s delay (check t = α2 ). The mChoice
module adds 3 units to the values of x1, x2 and z, and resets y1, y2. Due to the mChoice
module, the clock values are x1 = 3 + α − t − δ, z = 4 + 12j + ε2, x2 = 3 + α, y1 = 1, y2 = 0.
If perturbator chooses to continue the simulation, then Restore module brings all the clocks
back to normal form. Hence upon entering F , the clock values are x1 = α − t − δ, z =
1
2j + ε2, x2 = y1 = 1, y2 = 0. This value of x1 is
α
2 + ε1, since t =
α
2 and ε1 = −δ, the
perturbation effect.
Let us now see how perturbator verifies t = α2 by entering the Choice module. The
Choice module also adds 3 units to the values of x1, x2 and z, and resets y1, y2. The module
Test IncC1> is invoked to check if t > α2 , and the module Test Inc
C1
< is invoked to check if
t < α2 . Note that using the mChoice module and the Choice module one after the other, the
clock values upon entering Test IncC1> or Test IncC1< are x1 = 6+α−t−δ, z = 7+ 12j +ε2, x2 =
6 + α, y1 = 0, y2 = 0.
Test IncC1> : The delay at A′ is 1 − α + t + δ, obtaining x2 = 7 + t + δ, and the cost
accumulated is 1−α+ t+ δ. At B′, 1− t− δ time is spent, obtaining x1 = 1− t− δ. Finally,
at C ′, a time t + δ is spent, and at D′, one time unit, making the total cost accumulated
2− α + 2t+ 2δ at the target location. The cost function at the target assigns the cost 0 for
all valuations, hence the total cost to reach the target is 2+2t−α+2δ which is greater than
2 + 2δ iff 2t− α > 0, i.e. iff t > α2 .
I Lemma 9. Assume that an increment Cb (b ∈ {0, 1}) module is entered with the clock
valuations in their normal forms. Then controller has a strategy to reach either location lj
corresponding to instruction Ij of the two-counter machine or a target location is reached with
cost at most 2 + |2δ|, where δ is the perturbation added by perturbator.
4.2 Complete Reduction
The entire reduction consists of constructing a module corresponding to each instruction Ii,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, of the two-counter machine. The first location of the module corresponding to
instruction I1 is the initial location. We simulate the halting instruction In by a target location
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with cost function cf : R5≥0 → {0}. We denote the robust timed automaton simulating the
two counter machine by A, s is the initial state (l,0,0).
I Lemma 10. The two counter machine halts if and only if there is a strategy σ of controller
such that limcostA(σ, s) ≤ 2.
The details of the decrement and zero test modules are in Appendix B. They are similar
to the increment module; if player 2 desires to verify the correctness of player 1’s simulation,
a cost > 2 + |2δ| is accumulated on reaching a target location iff player 1 cheats. In the
limit, as δ → 0, the limcost will be > 2 iff controller cheats. The other possibility to obtain
a limcost > 2 is when the two counter machine does not halt.
5 Decidability of One-clock RPTG
A Dwell-time PTG
-1
[1, 2]
A
1
[0, 3]
Bx < 2
x := 0
x < 1
In order to show the decidability of the optimal reachability game for 1 clock RPTG R
and a fixed δ > 0, we perform a series of reachability and optimal cost preserving trans-
formations. The idea is to reduce the RPTG into a simpler priced timed game, while
preserving the optimal costs. The advantages of this conversion is that the semantics of
PTGs are easier to understand, and one could adapt known algorithms to solve PTGs.
On the other hand, the PTGs that we obtain are 1-clock PTGs with dwell-time requirement
(having restrictions on minimum as well as maximum amount of time spent at certain loca-
tions), see for example, a dwell-time PTG with two locations A,B. A minimum of 1 and a
maximum of two units of time should be spent at A, while a maximum of 3 time units can
be spent at B. If we wish to model this using standard PTGs, we need one extra clock and
we can not use the decidability results of 1 clock PTG to show the decidability of our model.
We show in Section 5.4 how to solve 1-clock PTGs with dwell-time requirements.
Our transformations are as follows: (i) for a given δ, our first transformation reduces the
RPTG R into a dwell-time PTG G (Section 5.1); (ii) our second transformation restricts to
dwell-time PTGs where the clock is bounded by 1 + δ. To achieve this, we use a notion
of fractional resets, and denote these PTGs as GF (Section 5.2); (iii) our third and last
transformation restricts GF without resets (Section 5.3). The reset-free dwell-time PTG is
denoted GF′. For each transformation, we prove that the optimal cost in each state of the
original game is the same as the optimal cost at some corresponding state of the new game.
We also show that an (,N)-strategy of the original game can be computed from some (′, N ′)-
strategy in the new game. The details of each transformation and correctness is established in
subequent sections. We then solve GF ′ employing a technique inspired by [5] while ensuring
that the robust semantics are satisfied.
5.1 Transformation 1: RPTG R to dwell-time PTG G
R and G
k
A
t
k′
B
e
g, r
k
A
t− δ
0
(A, e)
0
k
(A, e)+
[δ, 2δ]
k
(A, e)−
[0, δ]
k′
B
g′
r
r
Given a one clock RPTG R = (L1, L2, {x} , X, η, T, fgoal) and a δ > 0, we
construct a dwell-time PTG G = (L1, L2 ∪ L′, {x} , X ′, η′, T, fgoal). All the
controller, perturbator locations of R (L1 and L2) are carried over respectively
as player 1, player 2 locations in G. In addition, we have some new player 2
locations L′ in G. The dwell-time PTG G constructed has dwell-time restrictions
for the new player 2 locations L′. The locations of L′ are either urgent, or
have a a dwell-time of [δ, 2δ] or [0, δ]. All the perturbator transitions of R are
retained as it is in G. Every transition in R from a controller location A to
some location B is replaced in G by a game graph as shown. Let e = (A, g, r, B)
be the transition from a controller location A to a location B with guard g, and
reset r. Depending on the guard g, in the transformed game graph, we have
the new guard g′. If g is x = H, then g′ is x = H − δ, while if g is H < x < H +1, then g′ is
H − δ < x < H +1− δ, for H > 0. When g is 0 < x < K, then g′ is 0 ≤ x < K− δ and x = 0
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stays unchanged. It can be seen that doing this transformation to all the controller edges of
a RPTG R gives rise to a dwell-time PTG G.
Lets consider the transition from A to B in R. Assume that the transition from A to B
(called edge e) had a constraint x = 1, and assume that x = ν on entering A. Then, in R,
controller elapses a time 1 − ν, and reaches B; however on reaching B, the value of x is in
the range [1 − δ, 1 + δ] depending on the perturbation. Also, the cost accumulated at A is
k ∗ (1− ν+ γ), where γ ∈ [−δ, δ]. To take into consideration these semantic restrictions of R,
we transform the RPTG R into a dwell-time PTG G. First of all, we change the constraint
x = 1 into x = 1 − δ from A (a player 1 location) and enter a new player 2 location (A, e).
This player 2 location is an urgent location. The correct strategy for player 1 is to spend a
time 1− ν − δ at A (corresponding to the time 1− ν he spent at A in R). At (A, e), player 2
can either proceed to one of the player 2 locations (A, e)− or (A, e)+. The player 2 location
(A, e) models perturbator’s choices of positive or negative perturbation in R. If player 2 goes
to (A, e)−, then on reaching B, the value of x is in the interval [1 − δ, 1] (this corresponds
to perturbator’s choice of [−δ, 0] in R) and if he goes to (A, e)+, then the value of x at B is
in the interval [1, 1 + δ] (this corresponds to perturbator’s choice of [0, δ] in R). The reset
happening in the transition from A to B in R is now done on the transition from (A, e)− to
B and from (A, e)+ to B. Thus, note that the possible ranges of x as well as the accumulated
cost in R while reaching B are preserved in the transformed dwell-time PTG.
I Lemma 11. Let R be a RPTG and G be the corresponding dwell-time PTG obtained using
the transformation above. Then for every state s in R, OptCostR(s) = OptCostG(s). An
(,N)−strategy in R can be computed from a (,N)−strategy in G and vice versa.
Proof In Appendix C.
5.2 Transformation 2: Dwell-time PTG G to Dwell-time FRPTG GF
GF
k
Abt− δ
0 (A, e)b
0
k
(A, e)+b
[δ, 2δ]
k(A, e)0b+1
0
k
(A, e)−b
[0, δ]
k′
Bb
k′
Bb+1
x=1−δ
r
r
r
x≥1, [x]:=0
x=1
{x}
Recall that the locations of the dwell-time PTG G is L1∪L2∪L′ where L1∪L2 are
the set of locations of R, and L′ are new player 2 locations introduced in G. In this
section, we transform the dwell-time PTG G into a dwell-time PTG GF having the
restriction that the value of x is in [0,1] at all locations corresponding to L1 ∪ L2,
and is in [0, 1 + δ] at all locations corresponding to L′. While this transformation
is the same as that used in [5], the main difference is that we introduce special
resets called fractional resets which reset only the integral part of clock x while
its fractional part is retained. For instance, if the value of x was 1.3, then the
operation [x] := 0 makes the value of x to be 0.3.
Given a one clock, dwell-time PTG G = (L1, L2 ∪ L′, {x} , X, η, T, fgoals) with M
being the maximum value that can be assumed by clock x, we define a dwell-time
PTG with fractional resets (FRPTG) GF . In GF , we have M + 1 copies of the
locations in L1 ∪ L2 as well as the locations in L′ with dwell time [0, δ], [0, 0].
These M + 1 copies of L′ have the same dwell-time restrictions in GF . The copies
are indexed by i, 0 ≤ i ≤ M , capturing the integral part of clock x in G. Finally, we have in
G, the locations of L′ with dwell-time restriction [δ, 2δ]. For each such location (A, e)+, we
have in GF , the locations (A, e)+i and (A, e)0i+1 for 0 ≤ i ≤M . The dwell-time restriction for
(A, e)+i is same as (A, e)
+, while locations (A, e)0i+1 are urgent. The prices of locations are
carried over as they are in the various copies.
The transitions in GF consists of the following: (1) li (g−i)∩0≤x<1−−−−−−−−−→ mi1 if l g−→ m ∈ X;
(2) li
(g−i)∩0≤x<1;{x}−−−−−−−−−−−−→ m0 if l g;{x}−−−→ m ∈ X; (3) li x=1,{x}−−−−−→ li+1, for l ∈ L1 ∪ L2, and
(A, e)+i
x≥1,[x]:=0−−−−−−−→ (A, e)0i+1 for i < M . Consider for example, the constraint g′ between
1 g − i represents the constraint obtained by shifting the constraint by −i
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A and (A, e) as x = (b + 1) − δ in G. Then the value of x is b + (1 − δ) for b < M
when (A, e)+ is entered in G. The location (A, e)+ with ν(x) = b + (1 − δ) is represented
in GF as (A, e)+b with ν(x) = 1 − δ. If player 2 spends [δ, 2δ] time at (A, e)+ in G, then
ν(x) ∈ [b + 1, b + 1 + δ]. If there are no resets to goto B, then ν(x) ∈ [b + 1, (b + 1) + δ] at
B. Correspondingly in GF , ν(x) ∈ [1, 1 + δ] at (A, e)+b . By construction, Bb is not reachable,
since we check 0 ≤ x < 1 on the transition to Bb. The fractional reset is employed to
obtain x = δ while moving to (A, e)0b+1. This ensures that x = δ on reaching Bb+1, thereby
preserving the perturbation, and keeping x < 1. A normal reset would have destroyed the
value obtained by perturbation. The mapping f between states of G and GF is as follows:
f(l, x) = (lb, x − b), b < M , and x ∈ [b, b + 1], l ∈ L1 ∪ L2, f((A, e), x) = ((A, e)b, x − b),
b < M , and x ∈ [b, b+ 1], f((A, e)−, x) = ((A, e)−b , x− b), b < M , and x ∈ [b, b+ 1]. Finally,
f((A, e)+, x) = ((A, e)+b , x− b), b < M , and x ∈ [b, b+1]∪ [b+1, b+2]. Note that in the last
case, the value of x− b can exceed 1 but is less than or equal to 1 + δ.
I Lemma 12. For every state (l, ν) in G, OptCostG(l, ν) in G is the same as OptCostGF (f(l, ν))
in GF . For every  > 0, N ∈ N, an (,N)-acceptable strategy in G can be computed from an
(,N)-acceptable strategy in GF and vice versa.
5.3 Transformation 3: Dwell-time FRPTG GF to resetfree FRPTG GF ′
We now apply the final transformation to the FRPTG GF and construct a reset-free version
of the FRPTG denoted GF′. Assume that there are a total of n resets (including fractional re-
sets) in the FRPTG. GF′ consists of n+1 copies of the FRPTG : GF 0,GF 1, . . . ,GFn. Given the
locations L of the FRPTG, the locations of GF i are Li, 0 ≤ i ≤ n. GF 0 starts with l0, where l
is the initial location of the FRPTG and continues until a resetting transition happens. At the
first resetting transition, GF 0 makes a transition to GF 1. The nth copy is directed to a sink tar-
get location S with cost function cf : R≥0 → {+∞} on the (n+1)th reset. Note that each GF i
is reset-free. One crucial property of each GF i is that on entering with some value of x in [0, δ],
the value of x only increases as the transitions go along in GF i; moreover, x ≤ 1 + δ in each
GF i by construction. The formal details and proof of Lemma 13 can be found in Appendix E.Example
y
x
Superimposition
f2
f1
y
x
Interior
y
x
Exterior
Using the cost function of S and those of the targets, we compute the optimal cost functions
for all the locations of the deepest component GFn. The cost functions of the locations of
GF i are used to compute that of GF i−1, and so on until the cost function of l0, the starting
location of GF 0 is computed. An example can be seen in Appendix F.
I Lemma 13. For every state (l, ν) in GF , OptCostGF (l, ν) = OptCostGF′(l0, ν), whereGF′ is the resetfree FRPTG. For every  > 0, N ∈ N, given an (,N)-acceptable strategy
σ′ in GF′, we can compute a (2,N)-acceptable strategy σ in GF and vice versa.
5.4 Solving the Resetfree FRPTG
Before we sketch the details, let us introduce some key notations. Observe that after our
simplifying transformations, the cost functions cf are piecewise-affine continuous functions
that assign a value to every valuation x ∈ [0, 1+δ] (construction of FRPTG ensures x≤1+δ
always). The interior of two cost functions f1 and f2 is a cost function f3 : [0, 1 + δ] →
R defined by f3(x) = min(f1(x), f2(x)). Similarly, the exterior of f1 and f2 is a cost
function f4 : [0, 1 + δ] → R defined as f4(x) = max(f1(x), f2(x)). Clearly, f3 and f4
are also piecewise-affine continuous. The interior and exterior can be easily computed by
superimposing f1 and f2 as shown graphically in the example by computing lower envelope
and upper envelope respectively.
We now work on the reset-free components GF i, and give an algorithm to compute
OptCostGF i(l, ν) for every state (l, ν) of GF i, ν(x) ∈ [0, 1+ δ]. We also show the existence
of an N such that for any  > 0, and every l ∈ Li, ν(x) ∈ [0, 1 + δ], an (,N)-acceptable
strategy can be computed. Consider the location of GF i that has the smallest price and
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call it lmin. If this is a player 1 location, then intuitively, player 1 would want to spend
as much time as possible here, and if this is a player 2 location, then player 2 would want to
spend as less time as possible here. By our assumption, all the cycles in GF i are non-negative,
and hence if lmin is part of a cycle, revisiting it will only increase the total cost if at all. Player
1 thus would like to spend all the time he wants to during the first visit itself. We now prove
that this is indeed the case. We consider two cases separately.
5.4.1 lmin is a Player 1 location
We split GF i such that lmin is visited only once. We transform GF i into GF′′ which has two
copies of all locations except lmin such that corresponding to every location l 6= lmin, we have
the copies (l, 0) and (l, 1). A special target location S is added with cost function assigning
+∞ to all clock valuations.
Duplicate L− lmin
A
B
l
lmin
C
D
unroll to
A, 0
B, 0
C, 0
D, 0
l
lmin
A, 1
B, 1
C, 1
D, 1
∞
Given the transitions X of GF i, the FRPTG GF′′ has the following transitions.
if l g−→ l′ ∈ X and l, l′ 6= lmin then (l, 0) g−→ (l′, 0) and (l, 1) g−→ (l′, 1)
if l g−→ l′ ∈ X and l′ = lmin then (l, 0) g−→ lmin and (l, 1) g−→ S,
if lmin
g−→ l, then lmin g−→ (l, 1)
I Lemma 14. For every state (l, ν) if ν∈[0, 1 + δ] and l 6=lmin, we have that
OptCostGF i(l, ν) = OptCostGF′′((l, 0), ν) and OptCostGF i(lmin, ν) = OptCostGF′′(lmin, ν).
We give an intuition for Lemma 14. Locations (l, 0) have all the transitions avail-
able to location l in GF i. Also, any play in GF′′ which is compatible with a winning
strategy of player 1 in GF i contains only one of the locations (l, 0), (l, 1) by con-
struction of GF′′. The outcomes from (l, 0) are more favourable than (l, 1) for l as
a player 1 location. Based on these intuitions, we conclude that OptCostGF i(l, ν) is
same as that for ((l, 0), ν). This observation also leads to the −optimal strategy
being the same as that for (l, 0). Given a strategy σ′ in GF′′, we construct σ in GF i
as σ(l, ν) = σ′((l, 0), ν). Further, any strategy that revisits lmin in GF i cannot be win-
ning for player 1, since all cycles are non-negative; we end up at S with cost ∞ in GF′′.
However, all strategies that do not revisit lmin in GF i are preserved in GF′′, and hence
OptCostGF i(lmin, ν) = OptCostGF′′(lmin, ν). We iteratively solve the part of GF ′′ with loca-
tions indexed 1 (i.e; (l, 1)) in the same fashion (picking minimal price locations) each time
obtaining a smaller PTG. Computing the cost function of the minimal price location of the
last such PTG, and propagating this backward, we compute the cost function of lmin. We
then use the cost function of lmin to solve the part of GF′′ with locations indexed 0 (i.e; (l, 0)).
Computing the Optcost function of lmin: Algorithm 1 computes the optcost function
for a player 1 location lmin, assuming all the constraints on outgoing transitions from lmin
are the same, namely x ∈ [0, 1]. We discuss adapting the algorithm to work for transitions
with different constraints in Appendix G. A few words on the notation used: if a location l
has price η(l), then slope associated with l is −η(l) (see STEP 3 in Algorithm 1).
Let l1, . . . , ln be the successors of lmin, with cost functions f1, . . . , fn. Each of these cost
functions are piecewise affine continuous over the domain [0, 1]. The first thing to do is
to superimpose f1, . . . , fn, and obtain the cost function f corresponding to the interior of
f1, . . . , fn (lmin is a player 1 location and would like to obtain the minimal cost, hence the
interior). The line segments comprising f come from the various fi. Let dom(f) = [0, 1] be
composed of 0 = ui1 ≤ vi1 = ui2 ≤ . . . uim ≤ vim = 1 : that is, f(x) = fij (x), dom(fij ) =
[uij , vij ], for ij ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Let us denote fij by gj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Then,
f is composed of g1, g2, . . . , gm, and dom(f) is composed of dom(g1), . . . , dom(gm) from left
to right. Let dom(gi) = [ui, vi]. Step 2 of the algorithm achieves this.
For a given valuation ν(x), if lmin is an urgent location, then player 1 would go to a
location lk if the interior f is such that f(ν(x)) = gk(ν(x))(the least cost is given by gk,
obtained from the outside cost function of lk). If lmin is not an urgent location, then player 1
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Algorithm 1: Optimal Cost Algorithm when lmin is a Player 1 location
Let l1, . . . , ln be the successors of lmin with optcost functions f1, f2 · · · fn.;
STEP 1 : Superimpose : Superimpose all the optcost functions f1, f2 · · · fn.;
STEP 2 : Interior : Take the interior of the superimposition; call it f .;
Let f be composed of line segments g1, g2 · · · gm such that gi ∈ {f1, . . . , fn}, for all i.
∀ k, let the domain of gk be [uk, vk]. Set i = m.;
STEP 3 : Selective Replacement : while i ≥ 1 do
if slope of gi ≤ −η(lmin) then
replace gi with line hi with slope −η(lmin) and passing through (vi, gi(vi));
Let hi intersect gj (largest j < i) at some point x = v′′j , v′′j ∈ [uj , vj ];
Update domain of gj from [uj , vj ] to [uj , v′′j ];
if j < i− 1 then
Remove functions gj+1 to gi−1 from f
Set i = j;
else
i = i− 1;
STEP 4 : Refresh Interior : Take the interior after STEP 3 and call it f ′.;
if l′′ −→ lmin then
update the optcost function of l′′
would prefer delaying t units at lmin so that ν(x)+ t ∈ [ui, vi] rather than goto some location
li if gi(ν(x)) > η(lmin)(vi − ν(x)). Again, gi is a part of the ouside cost function of li, and
player 1 prefers delaying time at lmin rather than goto li since that minimizes the cost. In this
case, the cost function f is refined by replacing the line segment gi over [ui, vi] by another line
segment hi passing through (vi, gi(vi)), and having a slope −η(lmin). Step 3 of the algorithm
does this.
Recall that by our transformation 2, the value of clock x in any player 1 location is ≤ 1−δ.
The value of x is in [1− δ, 1 + δ] only at a player 2 location ((A, e)b+ in the FRPTG, section
5.2). Hence, the domain of cost functions for player 1 locations is actually [0, 1 − δ], and
not [0, 1 + δ]. Let the domain of gm be [um, 1]. Then we can split gm into two functions
g1m, g
2
m with domains [um, 1 − δ] and [1 − δ, 1]. Now, we ensure that no time is spent in the
player 1 location lmin over dom(g2m), by not applying step 3 of the algorithm for g2m. This
way, selective replacement of the cost functions gi occur only in the domain [0, 1− δ], and we
remain faithful to transformation 2, and the semantics of RPTGs.
Computing Almost Optimal Strategies: The strategy corresponding to this computed
optcost is derived as follows. f ′ is the optcost of location lmin computed in Step 4 of the
algorithm. f ′ is composed of two kinds of functions (a) the functions gi computed in step 2 as
a result of the interior of superimposition and (b) functions hi which replaced some functions
gj from f , corresponding to delay at lmin. For functions hj of f ′ with domain [uj , vj ], we
prescribe the strategy to delay at lmin till x = vj when entered with clock x ∈ [uj , vj ].
For functions gi, that come from f at Step 2, where gi is part of some optcost function fk,
(fk is the optcost function of one of the successors lk of lmin), the strategy dictates moving
immediately to lk when entered with clock x ∈ [ui, vi].
Termination: Finally, we prove the existence of a number N , the number of affine segments
that appear in the cost functions of all locations. Start with the resetfree FRPTG with
m locations having p segments in the outside cost functions. Let α(m, p) denote the total
number of affine segments appearing in cost functions across all locations. The transformation
of resetfree components GF into GF′′ gives rise to two smaller resetfree FRPTGs with m− 1
locations each, after separating out lmin. The resetfree FRPTG (GF , 1) with m− 1 locations
indexed with 1 of the form (l, 1) are solved first, these cost functions are added as outside
cost functions to solve lmin, and finally, the cost function of lmin is added as an outside cost
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function to solve the resetfree FRPTG (GF , 0) with m−1 locations indexed with 0 of the form
(l, 0). Taking into account the new sink target location added, we have ≤ p+ 1 segments in
outside cost functions in (GF , 1). This gives atmost β = α(m− 1, p+ 1) segments in solving
(GF , 1), and α(1, p+ β) = γ segments to solve lmin, and finally α(m− 1, p+ γ) segments to
solve (GF , 0). Solving this, one can easily check that α(m, p) is atmost triply exponential in
the number of locations m of the resetfree component GF . Obtaining a bound of the number
of affine segments, it is easy to see that Algorithm 1 terminates; the time taken to compute
almost optimal strategies and optcost functions is triply exponential.
We illustrate the computation of Optcost of a Player 1 location in Figure 2. The proof of
Lemma 15 is given in Appendix G, while Lemma 16 follows from Lemma 15 and Step 4 of
Algorithm 1.
I Lemma 15. In Algorithm 1, if a function gi (in f of Step 2) has domain [ui, vi] and slope
≤ −η(l) then OptCost(l, ν) = (vi − ν) ∗ η(l) + g(vi).
I Lemma 16. The function f ′ in Algorithm 1 computes the optcost at any location l. That
is, ∀x ∈ [0, 1], OptCostG(l, x) = f ′(x).
Note that the strategy under construction is a player 1 strategy, and player 1 has no control
over the interval [1, 1+ δ]. x ∈ [1, 1+ δ] after a positive perturbation, and is under player 2’s
control. Thus, at a player 1 location, proving for x ∈ [0, 1] suffices.
5.4.2 lmin is a Player 2 location
If lmin is a player 2 location in the reset-free component GF i, then intuitively, player 2 would
want to spend as little time as possible there. Keeping this in mind, we first run steps 1,
2 of Algorithm 1 by taking the exterior of f1, . . . , fn instead of the interior(player 2 would
maximise the cost). There is no time elapse at lmin on running steps 1,2 of the algorithm.
Let f be the computed exterior using steps 1,2. If f comprises of functions gi having a
greater slope than −η(l), then it is better to delay at lmin to increase the cost. In this case,
player 2 would want to improve his optcost using Step 3, by spending time at lmin. Finally,
while doing Step 4, we take the exterior of the replaced functions hi and old functions gi.
Recall that our transformations resulted in 3 kinds of player 2 locations : urgent, those with
dwell-time restriction [0, δ] and finally those with [δ, 2δ]. The 3 cases are discussed in detail
in Appendix H.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we studied excess robust semantics and provided the first decidability result for
excess semantics and improved the known undecidability result with 10 clocks to 5 clocks. To
the best of our knowledge, the other known decidability result for robust timed games is under
the conservative semantics for a fixed δ, [9]. As a consequence of our decidability result, the
reachability problem for 1 clock PTG with arbitrary prices is shown to be decidable too under
the assumption that the PTG does not have any negative cost cycle. The decidability we show
is for a fixed perturbation bound δ > 0. We use δ in the constraints of the dwell-time PTG
after the first transformation for ease of understanding the robust semantics. Implementing
this in step 3 of Algorithm 1 and ensuring no time elapse in the interval [1 − δ, 1] takes no
extra effort while lmin is a player 1 location. In that sense, we could have avoided explicit use
of δ in the constraints in our simplifying transformations, and taken the appropriate steps
in the algorithm itself. The existence of limit-strategy with δ → 0 seems rather hard. Our
construction would not directly extend to limit-strategy problem as it is heavily dependant
on the fixed δ.
14 Revisiting Robustness in Priced Timed Games
2
l
A
B
0≤x≤1−δ
0≤x≤
1−δ
y
x
OptCost(A)
3
1.1
y
x
OptCost(B)
4
0.5
0.
5
3
0.
75 1.1
y
x
Step 1 : Superimpose
3
1.1
4
2.25
0.
25
1.26
0.
57
y
x
Step 2 : Interior
3
1.1
4
2.25
0.
25
1.26
0.
57
y
x
Step 3 : Selectively Replace
1.
1
−3
−7
10 −31.5
0.
9
y
x
Step 4 : Interior
1.
1
1.5
y
x
OptCost(l)
1.
1
0.5
0.
5
1.5
0.91
0.
54
0.
9
σ1(l,x)=

delay at l, 0≤x<0.5
go to B, 0.5≤x<0.54
delay at l, 0.54≤x≤0.9
go to A, x=0.9
go to A, 0.9<x≤1.1
Figure 2 Optcost Computation for a Player 1 location (δ = 0.1): we can keep the guards as
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and not apply Step 3 for x ∈ [1− δ, 1].
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Appendix
A Cost Functions
Example
-1
A
1
B
f
0≤x≤1
0≤x≤1x=1
f
3
0.5 1
OptCost of B
0.5
0.5 1
We illustrate the cost functions with an example. In the PTG given here, the cost function
f corresponding to the target gives the cost incurred when the target is entered various
values of clock x. For example, if target is reached with clock value x = 0 then cost
incurred is cost = 3 = f(0) while cost = 0 if entered with x ∈ [0.5, 1]. Suppose B is
entered with x = 0 and Player 1 decides to go to the target immediately with no delay at
B (i.e; delay d = 0) then the cost is cost = 1 ∗ d + f(v) = 1 ∗ 0 + f(0) = 3, and x = v
upon entering the target. However, if player 1 waited at B till x = 0.5 and then went to
target, the cost is 1 ∗ 0.5 + f(0.5) = 0.5. Similarly, if d = 0.75 then the cost is 0.75. From
this, we can infer that the best strategy for Player 1 to achieve the optimal cost is to wait
till x = 0.5 and then go to target. The second function labelled OptCost of B gives the
optimal cost achievable for every value of x that B is entered with. Similar analysis for
location A, reveals that the cost incurred is −1 if Player 2 went to target directly. Else,
he could wait at A and then go to B. Due to the negative price at A, it is obvious that
the best strategy for Player 2 is to go to B immediately. Thus, the optimal cost function
for A is the same as that of B.
B UndecidabilityProof
We present below a set of figures which depict in full detail the simulation of all the
instructions of two counter machine - increment, zero test and decrement.
First we describe a few support modules that will be used in the main modules for simu-
lating increment, zero test and decrement instructions.
B.1 Prevent perturbation module
For correct simulation of the instructions, it will often be needed that the delay made by
controller should not be perturbed by perturbator. The module in Figure 3 shows the con-
struction that prevents perturbator from making any perturbation along the edge from A
to B. In run ρ, the edge from B to the target ensures that if the delay chosen at A was
Module : Prevent perturbation
0ρ
A
0
B
0
C
0
x=1
{y2}
x=2 y2 6=1
0ρ′
A
0
B
0
C
x=1
Figure 3 Prevent perturbation module: x is some clock and x = k could be the constraint for any
k ∈ N. The triangle with 0 represents target location l with cost function cf(l) : R≥0 → 0.
perturbed then controller can achieve a cost 0. For better readability, we represent these
unperturbed edges as dashed arrows as shown in path ρ′. We note that the clock which is
used in the equality constraint, (x in Figure 3) cannot be reset along the same edge. If we
do not specify a clock that is being reset along the dashed edge, we consider it to be y2. For
any other clock, we show it as being reset along the dashed edge. Note that in the ‘prevent
perturbation module’, we need at least one equality constraint (x = 1 in Figure 3), thus
ensuring a deterministic delay.
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B.2 Choice module
Since we consider a priced timed automaton and not a PTG, perturbator does not own a
location from where it can suggest the successor location of its choice. We show in Figure 4,
the construction of a module that allows perturbator to choose the successor location. The
Module : Choice
0
A
0
B
0
C1
0
C2
0
L1
0
L2
0
{y1, y2} y1=1
{y1} y1=1y2≤2
y1
=1
y2
>
2
y2=3
{y1}
y2=3
{y1}
y2=4 y1 6=1
y2=4 y1 6=1
y1=0
{y2}
y1=0
{y2}
Figure 4 Choice module : Perturbator can choose to go to C2 if he peturbs the delay at B by a
positive value. If he does not perturb or perturbs by a negative value then goes to C1.
Module :mChoice
0
A
0
B
0
C1
0
C2
0
L1
0
L2
0
y1=1
{y2}
y1=2
{y1} y1=1y2≤2
y1
=1
y2
>
2
y2=3
{y1}
y2=3
{y1}
y2=4 y1 6=1
y2=4 y1 6=1
y1=0
{y2}
y1=0
{y2}
Figure 5 mChoice module: The mChoice (modified choice) module is the same as the Choice
module except for the fact that here the value of clock y1 is 1 upon entry.
delay from location A to location B can be perturbed by perturbator. Controller chooses C2 as
the successor if the perturbation is positive, and chooses C1 as its successor if the perturbation
is negative. We note that if the module was entered with x1 = α1, z = β, x2 = α2, y1 = y2 = 0
then upon leaving either L1 or L2 the clock values are x1 = 3+α1, z = 3+β, x2 = 3+α2, y1 =
y2 = 0. The mChoice (modified choice) module shown in Figure 5 is the same as the Choice
module except for the fact that here the value of clock y1 is 1 upon entry. Thus the constraint
on the edge between locations A and B is y1 = 2 instead of y1 = 1 as in choice module. Here
also the value of clocks x1, z and x2 are increased by 3 as in the choice module while clocks
y1 and y2 have value 0 on exit.
B.3 Restore module
Both choice and mChoice modules add a shift of 3 to the clock values x1, x2 and z. Since the
main modules simulating increment and decrement of the counters expect the values to be in
their normal forms, we need to remove the shift of 3; this is achieved by the Restore module
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Module : RestoreC1C2Inc
0
A
0
B
0
C
0
D
0
E
y1=0
{x2}
x1=4
{y1}
y1=0
{x1}
z = 5 {z}
z = 0∧
x2 < 1 x2=1
{y1}
y1=0
{x2}
Figure 6 Restore module : This is actually a group of four modules. RestoreC1C2Inc is shown in the
figure.
shown in Figure 6. The restore modules used in the main modules simulating the operations on
counter C1 are a group of four different modules as mentioned below. RestoreC1C2Inc denotes
the module used as part of the Increment module for counter C1. We also similarly have
RestoreC1C2Dec module which is used as part of the Decrement module. The Restore
C1C2
Dec
module is similar to the RestoreC1C2Inc module with the only difference being that the clock
constraint on the loop on C is z = 6 instead of z = 5 as in the RestoreC1C2Inc module. C1C2
here denotes that the fractional part of clock x1 is more than the fractional part of clock z.
We also use RestoreC2C1Dec and Restore
C2C1
Inc to denote that the fractional part of clock z is
more than the fractional part of clock x1. The RestoreC2C1Inc module can be obtained from
RestoreC1C2Inc module by replacing all the occurrences of clock x1 with clock z and replacing all
the occurrences of clock z with clock x1. RestoreC2C1Dec can also be obtained from Restore
C1C2
Dec
in the same way. The edge from location C to location D forces controller to take the loop
at location C only once. The RestoreC1C2Inc and Restore
C2C1
Inc modules are entered with clock
values x1 = 3 + 12i + ε1, z = 4 +
1
2j + ε2, x2 = y1 = y2 = 0, at the starting location A of the
module. At location E, the clock values are x1 = 12i + ε1, z =
1
2j + ε2, x2 = y1 = y2 = 0, i.e.
restored to their normal form.
The restore modules used in the modules simulating operations on counter C2 are ana-
logous. Corresponding to RestoreC1C2Inc , the delays at locations A, C and D are 1 − 12i − ε1,
1
2i + ε1 − 12j − ε2 and 12j + ε2 respectively, while the delays at locations B and E are 0. The
value of clock z at the entry of the RestoreC1C2Dec and Restore
C2C1
Dec is 5 + 12j + ε2 and the the
clock values at the exit are as RestoreC1C2Inc and Restore
C2C1
Inc modules.
We show below the main modules which are used for simulating zero test and decrement.
We show here the modules corresponding to the operations on counter C1. The modules
corresponding to the operations on counter C2 are analogous.
B.4 Decrement module
The module simulating decrement of counter C1 is shown in Figure 7. Recall that by the
normal form, the values of the clocks are x1 = 12i + ε1, z =
1
2j + ε2, y1 = y2 = x2 = 0 at l1.
1. Assume that c1 > 0 at l1. Controller can choose to goto B or D, since the constraints
on both the edges are the same. If c1 > 1, controller chooses to goto B, and if c1 = 1,
then controller goes to D. Consider c1 > 1, and controller visiting B. By the encoding,
x1 = 12i + ε1, i > 1, z =
1
2j + ε2, x2 = y1 = y2 = 0. Here ε1 and ε2 denote errors
accumulated so far in clocks x1 and z due to perturbation made by perturbator so far.
Figure 8 shows the section of the module shown in Figure 7 starting from location B. This
section simulates the decrement of counter C1 when the value of the counter is greater
than 1. The value of clock z simulating counter C2 remains unchanged.
Let us denote the value of x1 at the entry of the module Decrement C1 in Figure 8, i.e.
1
2i + ε1 by α. Thus the delays at locations B and C are respectively 1 − α and α. On
entry at D, we thus have x2 = α, y1 = 0, y2 = 1. A non-deterministic time t is spent at
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Module : Zero test and Decrement
0
l1
0
lj
0
B
0
D
y1=0
x1 = 1 ∧ y1=0
x1
6= 1 ∧
y1=
0
{x2}
x1
6= 1
∧ y
1=
0
Figure 7 Zero test and Decrement Module: This module simulates the instruction If (c1 = 0)
go to lj else go to l′j . The extensions from B and D are shown in Figures 8 and 9 respectively.
D simulating the decrement of C1. Ideally, t must be 1− 2α. Perturbator can perturb it
by δ, where δ can be both positive and negative and clock x1 is reset. On entering E we
thus have x1 = 0, y1 = t+ δ, x2 = α+ t+ δ. At the entry to mChoice module, the values
of the clocks are x1 = 1 − t − δ, z = 2 + 12j + ε2, x2 = 1 + α, y1 = 1, y2 = 0. To correctly
decrement C1 (whose value is i), 1− t should be exactly 2α, i.e. 12i−1 + 2ε1.
Perturbator uses the mChoice module to either continue the simulation (by going to the
Restore module) or verifies controller’s delay t. Due to the mChoice module, the clock
values are x1 = 4− t− δ, z = 5+ 12j + ε2, x2 = 4+α, y1 = 0, y2 = 0. If perturbator chooses
to continue the simulation, then the Restore module restores the clocks back to normal
form and hence upon entering l′j the clock values are x1 = 1 − t − δ, z = 12j + ε2, x2 =
0, y1 = 0, y2 = 0. Thus, we have x1 = 12i−1 + 2ε1 − δ, where 2ε1 − δ is the value due to
the perturbations so far.
However, if perturbator chooses to verify, he first goes to yets another Choice module.
If 1 − t > 2α, then the module Test DecC1> is used and if 1 − t < 2α, then the module
Test DecC1< is used. Note that due to the two Choice modules one after the other, the clock
values upon entering Test DecC1< or Test DecC1> are x1 = 7−t−δ, x2 = 7+α, y1 = y2 = 0.
Test DecC1> : At A′, on entry we have x1 = 7 − t − δ, x2 = 7 + α, y1 = y2 = 0. A
time 1 − α is spent at A′ with accumulated cost 2 − 2α.2 On entry to B, we have
x1 = 8 − α − t − δ, y1 = 1 − α. A time α is spent at B′, and x1 = 8 − t − δ. A time
t + δ is spent at C ′, obtaining y1 = t + δ. A time 1 − t − δ is spent at D′ obtaining the
accumulated cost 2− 2α+ 1− t− δ. The target is reached with this cost. If 1− 2α > t,
then this is > 2− δ. The perturbator can choose δ < 0, making this cost > 2.
2. Controller chooses the outgoing edge to D in Figure 7 if c1 is 1 in which case the decre-
mented value is 0 which is encoded by the exact value x1 = 1. The module from D has
been shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9 shows the section of the module of Figure 7 starting from location D. This
section simulates the decrement of counter C1 when c1 = 1. Upon entering D, in the Test
and Decrement module, the clock values are x1 = 12 + ε1, z =
1
2j + ε2, x2 = y1 = y2 = 0.
Let α denote the value of x1, i.e. 12 + ε1. The time elapsed in locations D,E and F in
Figure 9 are respectively 1 − α, α and 1. At the entry of the Choice module, the clock
values are x1 = 1, z = 2 + 12j + ε2, x2 = 1 + α, y1 = y2 = 0. Here x1 encodes the counter
value of C1 exactly and perturbator cannot perturb the delay made by the controller.
Perturbator uses the Choice module to either continue the simulation or it can verify the
2 The price 2 on A can be replaced with 1, by having a slightly longer sequence of transitions
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Module : Decrement C1
0
B
0
C
0
D
0
E
mChoice 0
F
RestoreC1C2Dec
RestoreC2C1Dec
0
l′j
x1 6= 1
∧y1 = 0
{y2}
x1=1
{x2}
y2=1
{y1}
y1 ≤ 1
{x1}
y1 = 1
{y2}
y1 = 0
{x2, y2}
y1=0
y1=0
y1=0
y1=0
Choice
Test DecC1< Test Dec
C1
>
y1=0
y 1
=0
y1=0
Test DecC1> 2
A′
0
B′
0
C ′
1
D′
0
y1=0 x2=8
x2=0
y1=1
{y1}
x1=8 y1=1
Figure 8 Decrement C1 module : The section of the module shown in Figure 7 starting from
location B. This section is used if c1 > 1 before being decremented. It keeps the fractional part of
clock z unchanged. The price 2 at A is a shorthand, and can be replaced with 1 on having a longer
sequence of transitions.
delay made by controller. Due to the Choice module, the clock values are x1 = 4, z =
5+ 12j +ε2, x2 = 4+α, y1 = y2 = 0. If perturbator chooses to continue the simulation then
the Restore module restores the clocks back to the normal form and hence upon entering
l′j the clock values are x1 = 1, z1 = 12j + ε2, x2 = y1 = y2 = 0.
However, if perturbator chooses to verify, he uses Test DecC1n=1 module to verify whether
controller chose this branch (D) of the Test and Decrement module when c1 = 1 or c1 > 1.
Test DecC1n=1 : On entry, we have x1 = 7, z = 8 + 12j + ε2, x2 = 7 + α, y1 = y2 = 0. The
delays at locations are: at A′ : 1− α obtaining y1 = 1− α on entering B′. A time elapse
of α at B′ gives x1 = α. Finally, at C ′, we elapse 1 − α. Thus the cost incurred in this
module is 3 − 3α. For c1 = 1, this is 3 − 32 − 2ε1 = 2 − 12 − 2ε1, and the minimum cost
when c1 > 1 is 3− 3 122 − 2ε1 = 2+ 14 − 2ε1. In the limit, as ε1 tends to 0, the cost is ≤ 2
if controller chose the correct branch, that is, chose D when c1 = 1.
3. Suppose controller chooses B instead of D when c1 = 1. Then the value of clock x1 after
simulating the decrement operation will not be exact, i.e.will not be equal to 1. Now, if
the next instruction involving controller C1 is also a zero test and decrement operation,
then controller will incorrectly move to l′j instead of lj while simulating this next zero test
and decrement operation. For choosing B instead of D, controller will be punished while
simulating this next zero test and decrement operation. Since the value of clock x1 is not
1, while simulating this next zero test and decrement operation, controller will either go
to B or D in the module in Figure 7.
If B is chosen, t should equal 1 − 2α for correct simulation. Now α being 1 + ε1,
controller cannot delay for 1− 2α at location D of Figure 8 and hence is punished.
If controller goes to location D in Figure 7, when c1 = 0, then x1 = 1 + ε1 = α then
perturbator moves to the module Test DecC1n=0. If ε1 > 0, then the controller will get
stuck in the transition from D to E (see Figure 9) and if ε1 < 0, then the module
Test DecC1n=0 in Figure 9 incurs a cost of 2 − 2ε1 > 2. The module Test DecC1n=0 can
be drawn similar to Test DecC1n=1.
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Module : Decrement C1 from 1 to 0
0
D
0
E
0
F
Choice 0
G
RestoreC1C2Dec
RestoreC2C1Dec
0
l′j
x1 6= 1
∧y1 = 0
{y2}
x1=1
{x2}
y1=1
{x1}
x1 = 1
{y1}
y1 = 0
{x2}
y1=0
y1=0
y1=0
y1=0
Choice
Test DecC1n=1 Test Dec
C1
n=0
y1=0
y 1
=0
y1=0
Test DecC1n=1 1
A′
0
B′
1
C ′
0
D′
1
E′
0
y1=0 x2=8 y1=1
{y1}{x1}
x1=1
{x1}
y1=1
{y1}
x1=1
Figure 9 Decrement C1 from 1 to 0 module : The section of the module shown in Figure
7 starting from location D. This section is used if c1 = 1 before being decremented. It keeps the
fractional part of clock z unchanged.
B.5 Complete Reduction
The entire reduction consists of constructing a module corresponding to each instruction Ii,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, of the two-counter machine. The first location of the module corresponding to
instruction I1 is the initial location. We simulate the halting instruction In by a target location
whose cost function assigns 2 to all clock values. We denote the robust timed automaton
simulating the two counter machine by A, s is the initial state (l,0,0).
I Lemma 17. The two counter machine halts if and only if there is a strategy σ of controller
such that limcostA(σ, s) ≤ 2.
Proof. We first consider the case when the two counter machine halts. Suppose it halts in m
steps. The cost incurred in m steps can be due to reaching one of the target states in a test
module or reaching the halt instruction in m steps. We consider an ε such that 0 < 3mδ < ε.
In the first case, the cost is less than or equal to 2+2εb, where by Lemma 18, εb ≤ ε and hence
the cost is 2 in the limit. In the second case, controller simulates the two counter machine
faithfully and reaches the target location corresponding to the halt instruction and hence the
cost is 2 in the limit.
Now we consider the case when the two counter machine does not halt. Controller can
simulate the two counter machine using the increment and the zero test and decrement mod-
ules corresponding to each of the instructions. The cost is ∞ if controller simulates the
instructions faithfully and a target state is not reached. On the other hand, if controller
makes an error, then it will be punished by perturbator in one of the test modules and cost
will be non-zero. Hence the proof. J
Given an accumulated delay ε, the accumulated delay after one step due to the decrement
and the increment modules are 2ε+δ1 and ε/2+δ2 respectively. The following lemma is from
[7].
I Lemma 18. [7] Consider the two functions f : x → 2x+ 1 and g : x → x/2 + 1. For any
n ≥ 1, x > 0, and any f1, . . . , fn ∈ {f, g}, f1 ◦ f2 ◦ · · · ◦ fn(x) ≤ 3nx.
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We note that the prices used in all the modules in our reduction are only {0, 1} and hence
we have the undecidability result as given by Theorem 7.
C Proof of Lemma 11
We first map the states of the RPTG R and the dwell-time PTG G. Let S(R) denote the
set of states of the form (l, ν) as well as ((l, ν), t, e) of the RPTG and S(G) denote the set of
states of the dwell-time PTG.
I Definition 19 (state map). We define a State Map f : S(R)→ S(G) as follows
if l is a controller(perturbator) location then f(l, ν) = (l, ν) as all controller locations of
R become player 1 locations in the dwell-time PTG G, and all the perturbator locations
of R become player 2 locations in the dwell-time PTG G;
Recall that the RPTG had states of the form ((l, ν), t, e) corresponding to perturbator
states (after controller chose a time delay and edge, perturbator decides the perturbation).
Recall also that for every controller location l, and corresponding edge choice e made in
the RPTG R, we had the urgent player 2 location (l, e) immediately following the player
1 location l in the dwell-time-PTG G constructed. That is, f((l, ν), t, e) = ((l, e), ν+ t−δ)
Note that f(s) is a unique state in G.
k
A
t
k′
B
e
g, r
RPTG R dwell time PTG G
k
A
t− δ
0
(A, e)
0
k
(A, e)+
[δ, 2δ]
k
(A, e)−
[0, δ]
k′
B
g′
ep
en
epo
r
r
eno
Figure 10 Transitions of RPTG R mapped to transitions in the constructed dwell-time PTG G
I Lemma 20. Given a path ρ in R from s to s′, there exists a unique path ρ′ in G from f(s)
to f(s′). Additionally, Cost(ρ) = Cost(ρ′).
The proof is quite straight forward and follows from the structure and the state map defined
above.
Next, given a strategy σ1 in R, we shall define an equivalent strategy σ′1 in G in terms
of the moves proposed. Let e be the edge from l to l′ in R. We map σ(ρ.s) = (t, e) to
σ′(ρ′.f(s)) = (t′, e′) as follows
1. Controller strategy mapped to Player 1 strategy :
The strategy σ1(ρ.(l, ν)) = (t, e) in R leads to the state ((l, ν), t, e). Corresponding to
this, we have σ′1(ρ′.f(l, ν)) = (t′, e′) such that t′ = t − δ 3 and the player 1 location l
moves into the urgent player 2 location (l, e). This leads to ((l, e), ν+ t− δ). e′ is the edge
in G between l and (l, e). Recall also that the time delay t in R has been mapped to the
time delay t− δ in the constructed PTG G.
2. Perturbator strategy mapped to Player 2 strategy for perturbator locations:
A strategy σ2(ρ.(l, ν)) = (t, e) in R leads to (l′, ν + t[r := 0]). Correspondingly, we have
in G, σ′2(ρ′.(l, ν)) = (t, e), giving the state (l′, ν + t[r := 0]) in G.
3 t ≥ δ in the R due to robust semantics
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3. Perturbator strategy mapped to Player 2 strategy for new locations :
Recall that we have f((l, ν), t, e) = ((l, e), ν + t− δ).
If we have the strategy σ2(ρ.((l, ν), t, e)) =  ∈ [−δ, δ] in R such that
if 0 ≤  ≤ δ then σ′2(ρ′.((l, e), ν + t− δ)) = (0, ep) which results in ((l, e)+, ν + t− δ)
and σ′2(ρ′.((l, e)
+
, ν + t− δ)) = (δ + , epo) resulting in (l′, ν + t− δ + δ + [r := 0]).
if −δ ≤  < 0, let ′ = − then σ′2(ρ′.((l, e), ν + t − δ)) = (0, en) which results in
ρ′.((l, e), ν + t− δ) 0,en−−−→ ((l, e)−, ν + t− δ) and σ′2(ρ′.((l, e)−, ν + t− δ)) = (δ − ′, eno)
resulting in ρ′.((l, e)−, ν + t − δ) δ−
′,eno−−−−−→ (l′, ν + t − δ + δ − ′[r := 0]). Note that on
entering (l, e)− with a value ν + t− δ, a time in  ∈ [0, δ] is spent at (l, e)−, obtaining
a valuation ν + t− δ+ . This corresponds to altering the time t spent by controller in
R to a value t− δ +  ∈ [t− δ, t].
Similarly, given a strategy σ′ in G, we shall construct the equivalent strategy σ in R as
follows.
1. Player 1 strategy to controller strategy If σ′1(s) proposes a delay t then σ1(f (−1)(s))
proposes a delay t+ δ.
2. Player 2 strategy to perturbator strategy in perturbator locations If σ′2(s) pro-
poses a delay t then σ2(f (−1)(s)) also proposes t.
3. Player 2 strategy to perturbator strategy in controller locations Suppose σ′2((l, e), ν+
t) suggests the path ((l, e)+, ν, c) δ+−−→ (l′, ν′). Then, σ2((l, ν), t+ δ, e) −→ (l′, ν′).
I Lemma 21. In the RPTG R given in Figure 10, if g is 0 < x < 1 then B is reached with
x ∈ [0, 1 + δ]. In the corresponding PTG G too, B is reached with x ∈ [0, 1 + δ]. We can
establish the same for other possible guards too.
I Lemma 22. Cost(s a−→ s′) = Cost(f(s) a
′··· f(s′)). That is, the cost of a transition from s
to s′ in the RPTG R is the same as the cost of going from f(s) to f(s′) in the dwell-time
PTG G. However, we need multiple transitions to reach from f(s) to f(s′).
Both the above lemmas follow from the definition of η′ and the delays adjusted over l, (l, e)−
and (l, e)+ in the PTG G.
I Lemma 23. Given a strategy σ1 in R and the corresponding strategy σ′1 in G, for every
state s in R, Cost(s, σ1) = Cost(f(s), σ′1).
Proof. Recall that CostR(s, σ1) = supσ2∈Strat2(R)(CostR(Outcome(s, σ1, σ2))).
Part 1: CostR(s, σ1) ≤ CostG(f(s), σ′1)
Consider a strategy σ2 in R. We can construct a strategy σ′2 in G as outlined above. From
Lemma 22, it is clear that the CostR(Outcome(s, σ1, σ2)) ≤ CostG(Outcome(f(s), σ′1, σ′2)).
Part 2: CostG(f(s), σ′1) ≤ CostR(s, σ1)
Consider a strategy σ′2 in G. We can construct a strategy σ2 in G as outlined above. The
selected semantics of G and Lemma 21 ensure that all of σ′2 proposed delays can be emulated
in R too. J
Along the same lines as the lemma above, we could also prove that Cost(s, σ2) = Cost(f(s), σ′2).
These two results pave the way for relating the optimal costs for states in the two games. We
shall establish OptCostδR(s) = OptCostG(f(s)) by proving two inequalities
(1) OptCostδR(s) ≤ OptCostG(f(s)) and
(2) OptCostG(f(s)) ≤ OptCostδR(s)
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OptCostδR(s) ≤ OptCostG(f(s))
Consider a strategy σ1 in R and construct an equivalent strategy σ′1 in G (this is possible,
Lemma 20). Now we shall prove that
supσ2∈Strat2(R)(Cost(Outcome(s, σ1, σ2))) = supσ′2∈Strat2(G)(Cost(Outcome(f(s), σ
′
1, σ
′
2))).
To this end, let us consider a perturbator strategy σ2 in R. Then we can construct an equi-
valent Player 2 strategy σ′2 such that Cost(Outcome(s, σ1, σ2)) = Cost(Outcome(s, σ′1, σ′2))
(follows from Lemma 22). Thus, we have shown that the set of strategies in G is at least as
large as those in R and whatever costs are achieved in R can be achieved in G too.
OptCostG(s) ≤ OptCostδR(s)
We shall now construct strategies in R from strategies in G. If σ′1(s) proposes a delay t then
σ1(f (−1)(s)) proposes t+ δ. Lemma 21 ensures that t+ δ will satisfy the guard. For example,
if the guard was 0 < x < 1 in R then the delay chosen by σ′1 is < 1− ν(x)− δ.
Similarly, we construct strategy σ2 from σ′2 as specified above. If σ′2((l, e), ν + t) suggests
the path ((l, e)+, ν) δ+−−→ (l′, ν′). Then, σ2((l, ν), t+ δ, e) −→ (l′, ν′′). We know that, ν′′ = ν′.
Once again, Lemma 21 ensures that if ν′ is in an interval I then ν′′ ∈ I. For example, for the
guard 0 < x < 1, ν′, ν′′ ∈ [0, 1 + δ].
Once we have mapped the strategies, the proof of OptCostG(s) ≤ OptCostδR(s) is along
the same lines as the previous case.
I Lemma 24. if σ1 in R is (,N)−acceptable then σ′1 in G is also (,N)−acceptable.
A strategy in R is said to be (,N)−acceptable if (1) it is memoryless, (2) is −optimal for
every state and (3) partitions [0, 1 + δ] into at most N intervals.
From the definition of equivalent strategy σ′1, it is easy to see that if σ1 is memoryless then
so is σ′1. Additionally, if σ1 has n intervals then σ′1 would also have n intervals except that
the intervals’ end points would be shifted by δ as the delay prescribed by σ′1 are t− δ when
σ1 suggests t. Finally, we can claim that −optimality is preserved from Lemma 23.
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Figure 11 FRPTG
We have already defined in section 5.2, the mapping between the states of the dwell-time
PTG G and the constructed dwell-time FRPTG GF . The mapping is defined in such a way
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that a state (l, ν) in G is mapped to the state (lb, ν − b), whenever ν ∈ [b, b+ 1]. the integral
part of the clock valuation is remembered in the state itself, while the valuation always stays
in [0,1]. The only exception to this is the location (l, e)b+, where the clock valuation can go
up to 1 + δ.The state ((l, e)b+, ν) in GF is the mapping of the state ((l, e)+, b+ ν) in G.
I Lemma 25. Given a path ρ in G from s to s′, there exists a unique path ρ′ in GF from
f(s) to f(s′). Additionally, Cost(ρ) = Cost(ρ′).
The proof of Lemma 25 is straightforward, given the mapping f . Any time elapse of 1
in any one state (l, ν) in G is captured by starting from some (lb, ν − b), and moving to
(lb+1, (ν + 1)− (b+ 1)) in GF and so on. Whenever the clock value reaches an integral value
in G, correspondingly in the GF , the state is updated by remembering the new integral part,
and updating the clock valuation to 0. Every path in G corresponds to a path in GF , where
the constraints on the path are shifted by an appropriate integer, depending on the integral
value remembered in the current state.
This also gives a mapping between the strategies of G and GF . Also, the costs are preserved
across paths : any path in G is mapped to a longer path in GF so that the individual time
delays in GF never exceed 1. Since the prices of states are preserved by the mapping, the
costs will add up to be the same. It is easy to see that a copy-cat strategy works between
G and GF , and hence, costs, optimal costs are preserved. Since strategies are copy-cat, all
properties like (,N)-acceptability are also preserved across games.
E FRPTG to Reset-free FRPTG
Given a one clock FRPTG GF = (L1, L2, {x} , X, η, T ) with n resets (including fractional
resets), we define a reset-free FRPTG as follows : GF′ = (L′1, L′2, {x} , X ′, η′, T ′) where
For l ∈ L1 and 0 ≤ j < n, we have lj ∈ L′1;
For l ∈ L2 and 0 ≤ j < n, we have lj ∈ L′2;
S 6∈ L1 ∪ L2 is a sink location such that S ∈ L′2;
X ′ has the following transitions.
lj
g−→ l′j if l g−→ l′ ∈ X;
lj
g,r−−→ l′j+1 if l g,r−−→ l′ ∈ X, j < n and r is either {x} or [x]:=0;
ln
g,r−−→ S if l g,r−−→ l′ ∈ X and r is either {x} or [x]:=0;
S −→ S;
η′(lj) = η(l) and lj ∈ T ′ if l ∈ T .
We illustrate the construction of a resetfree FRPTG in Figure 13, corresponding to the
FRPTG in Figure 12. Note that the locations in the upper rectangle form the the first copy
GF -0 and while the lower rectangle forms the second copy GF -1. A copy GF -i indicates the
number of resets seen so far from the initial location l00 of the first copy GF -0.
E.1 Proof of Lemma 13
Proof. Consider any state (l, ν) in GF . The reduction from the FRPTG GF to the reset-free
FRPTG GF′ creates a new component (or copy) for each new reset, including fractional resets.
Given that there are a total of n resets in the FRPTG, GF , n+ 1 reset-free components are
created in the reset-free FRPTG GF′, and the last component goes to a location with cost
+∞. By assumption, the cycles in each reset-free component are non-negative. Any cycle in
the FRPTG GF involving a reset is mapped to a path in the reset-free FRPTG GF ′ ending
at the location S with cost +∞, while any reset-free cycle in GF is mapped to a cycle in one
of the n+1 reset-free components of the reset-free FRPTG GF′. Clearly, for every strategy σ
of player 1, 2 in GF , there is a corresponding strategy σ′ in the GF′ and vice-versa, obtained
using the above mapping of paths between GF and GF′. Given that the prices of locations are
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Figure 12 FRPTG
preserved between GF and GF′, the optimal cost from (l, ν) in GF is the same as the optimal
cost from (l0, ν) in GF′.
Consider a (,N)-acceptable strategy σ′ in GF′. Consider a winning state (l0, ν). Let i be
the minimum number of resets from state (l0, ν) along any path compatible with σ′. That is,
the player can win from (ln−i, ν) but not from (ln−i+1, ν). If (l, ν) is not winning then we take
i = n+1. We denote by σ′n−i the suggestions made by σ′ in the n− ith copy in GF′. We then
assign σ(l, ν) = σ′n−i(ln−i, ν). Thus, we obtain that CostGF ((l, ν), σ) = CostGF′((ln−i, ν), σ′).
Since (l0, ν) and (ln−i, ν) have the same outgoing transitions, we know that the strategy σ′
from (l0, ν) will be atleast as costly as OptCostGF′(ln−i, ν). That is,
CostGF′((l0, ν), σ′) ≥ OptCostGF′(ln−i, ν) (1)
Now, if CostGF′((ln−i, ν), σ′) > CostGF′((l0, ν), σ′)+, then by Equation 1 we have CostGF′((ln−i, ν), σ′) >
OptCostGF′(ln−i, ν) +  which means σ′ is not -optimal. Thus we have,
CostGF′((ln−i, ν), σ′) ≤ CostGF′((l0, ν), σ′) + 
CostGF ((l, ν), σ) = CostGF′((ln−i, ν), σ′)

≤ CostGF′((l0, ν), σ′) + 
≤ OptCostGF′(l0, ν) + + 
≤ OptCostGF (l, ν) + 2
J
We shall now focus on informally explaining why fractional resets would not cause a
problem. In a PTG without fractional resets, a resetting transition e (say l x=1,x:=0−−−−−−→ m) taken
twice takes us back to the same state (m,x = 0) twice. This crucial property is the back bone
of the transformation which removes resets in [5]. The correctness proof is by constructing
optcost preserving strategies for Player 1 in both G and its resetfree equivalent G′. Given a
winning strategy for Player 1 in PTG G, a strategy in G′ is constructed so as to ensure each
resetting transition is taken atmost once. This is possible because a resetting transition e
appearing the second time, results in the same state (m, 0) and hence the transitions possible
(and the optcost achievable) from the second resultant state (m, 0) can be applied the first
time this state occurs itself. In other words, the second occurrences of the transition are
replacable as they result in the same unique state (m, 0). It should be the case that a path
exists such as to avoid the second occurrence of the resetting transition as the strategy is
winning for Player 1.
Now, a similar reasoning will not work for fractional resets e′ (say l′ x≥1,[x]:=0−−−−−−−→ m′) as the
resulting state (m′, x) after a fractional reset transition is not unique (as the clock x ∈ [0, δ])
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Resetfree FRPTG
Figure 13 Resetfree FRPTG - two copies GF −0 and GF −1 correspoding to the number of resets
encounterd so far i.e; GF − 0 indicates that 0 resets have been seen so far and GF − 1 indicates 1
(fractional) reset has been seen.
and thus we can not adopt this argument directly. Firstly, the player 2 location (l, e)+i is
entered with x ≤ 1− δ (see Transformation 2) and a delay d makes x ∈ [1, 1 + δ]. This delay
happens entirely in this location and is chosen entirely by Player 2. From (l, e)+i , if player 2
moves to a (l, e)i+10 location, then the value of x is in [0, δ]. Note that the value of x, say ζ
in (l, e)i+10 is indeed the perturbation that happened in the RPTG R : in the FRPTG, at
(l, e)+i , player 2 elapses δ + ζ. Recall that if in R, a location l was entered with value of x
being ν, then in the FRPTG, we enter (l, e)i and (l, e)+i with ν − i − δ. Player 2 at (l, e)+i
makes this value to be ν − i + ζ, which is exactly same as the perturbed value of x in R
when perturbator chooses a positive perturbation. The point to note is that whevener player
2 returns to (l, e)+i , the control of perturbation is his; thus, any ζ that is achieved the kth
time can be achieved the first time itself by player 2. Moreover, if player 2 has a strategy to
revisit (l, e)+i , then clearly, player 1 will lose, since after n+ 1 times, the control reaches the
target with cost∞. Note also that in Algorithm 1, while we solve for (l, e)+i , we will have the
optcost function computed for (l, e)i+10. Player 2 will choose to delay δ + ζ for that ζ where
the cost is maximal in the optcost of (l, e)i+10.
F Example : Solve Reset-Free FRPTG
We shall first look at how normal resets are handled. As detailed by the resetfree construc-
tion, each copy of the FRPTG is an SCC and there are n+1 copies when the FRPTG has n
resets. The i+1th copy is solved and its optcost functions are used as outside cost functions
while solving the ith copy. This is depicted clearly in the figure below.
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GF i
GF i+1
L f
M
x=1
x := 0
x=1 x := 0
x
f
1
1+δ
x
OptCost of M
1.2
1+δ
Location L in GF i has two transitions with resets - one to a target and another to a location
M in GF i+1 whose optcost function has already been computed. Due to the clock reset, the
target or M are entered with clock value x = 0 and hence the only values of interest are : the
cost function f of the target at x = 0 i.e; f(0) = 1 and optcost for locationM at x = 0 i.e; 1.2.
Since L is a Player 1 location, the lower of these two values is picked and the corresponding
transition is selected.
Now let us now consider fractional resets. The following figure depicts the previously
conidered example with normal reset replaced with fractional reset.
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GF i+1
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(A, e)+b
Bb
1
(A, e)0b+1
e2, x<1
e1, x≥1 [x] := 0
x
f
1
1+δ
x
OptCost of (A, e)0b+1
1.2
1+δδ=0.2 x
Cost of taking e1
from (A, e)+b
1.2
1+δ
2.2
Recall from Transformation 2 (Dwell-time PTG G to FRPTG GF ) that fractional resets
occur only along transitions from (A, e)+b to (A, e)
0
b+1. Lets call this transition e1. From the
construction of FRPTG, we also know that the only other transition possible from (A, e)+b is
to location Bb, corresponding to the transition from A to B in the RPTG. Let us denote this
transition as e2. by construction of the reset-free FRPTG, the constraint on (A, e)+b −→ Bb
is x < 1. Figuring out which part of the cost functions of Bb and (A, e)0b+1 to consider for
the optcost computation of (A, e)+b is a little different from the normal reset case. Here the
guards on transitions can be considered as 0 ≤ x < 1 for e2 and 1 ≤ x ≤ 1 + δ for e1.
Hence we should consider the entire cost function of Bb, while taking only the x ∈ [0, δ]
part from the function of (A, e)0b+1. Recall that fractional resets removed the integer part of
x, thereby taking x from [1, 1+ δ] to [0, δ]. Thus the cost function of taking the transition to
(A, e)0b+1 is equal to (delay of waiting at (A, e)
+
b till x = v ∈ [1, 1+ δ]) + (optcost of (A, e)0b+1
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at 1− v). We compute this cost as outlined in Figure 15. It is easy to see that since the price
of (A, e)+b is 1, and the slope of the optcost function of (A, e)
0
b+1 is −1.2, it is more profitable
to reach (A, e)0b+1 at x = 0 than at x = δ i.e; the transition e1 when x = 1, thus reaching
(A, e)0b+1 at x = 0 after the fractional reset, rather than wait at (A, e)
+
b till x = 1 + δ and
then reach (A, e)0b+1 at x = δ yielding only 2.16 (wait till x = 1 + δ incurring 1.2 and then
optcost of (A, e)0b+1 at x = δ is 0.96).
We consider this cost function of taking the transition e1 and the cost function of Bb to
compute the optcost function of (A, e)+b . In this example, it is clearly better for Player 2 to
take e1 at x = 1 and hence the cost function of taking e1 is the optcost of (A, e)+b .
G Algorithm for OptCost Computation : l is a player 1 location
We first prove Lemma 15.
Proof. The optcost computation for a location lmin is done using the already computed
optcosts of all successors of lmin, which we now treat as outside cost functions. The Steps 1
and 2 in Algorithm 1, superimpose the outside cost functions corresponding to lmin and take
the interior. Recall that step 3 is applied right to left : we start the selective replacement from
ν = 1 + δ and proceed towards 0. We know that up to vi, for all ν ≥ vi, OptCost(lmin, ν) =
f(vi).
Now we have to compute the optcost for ν ∈ [ui, vi]. As we have taken the interior of the
superimposed function in Step 2, we know that gi is the best (lowest) possible cost if we do
not delay at lmin. Let us determine if delaying at lmin is more profitable than following gi.
The two options we have are :
1. Follow gi whose slope is −m. The line segment gi is given by y = −mx + c where
c = f(vi) +mvi, since y = gi(vi) = f(vi) at x = vi; (f is continuous, and is composed of
g1, . . . , gm) and
2. delay at lmin till x = vi and exit at vi. The line segment corresponding to the delay at
lmin is y = −η(lmin)∗x+ c′ where c′ = f(vi)+η(lmin)∗vi as we delay at lmin until x = vi
and follow f , thus obtaining f(vi) at x = vi
Now comparing these two equations we get the following.
−mx+ c ∼ −η(lmin) ∗ x+ c′
−mx+ f(vi) +mvi ∼ −η(lmin) ∗ x+ f(vi) + η(lmin) ∗ vi
−mx+mvi ∼ −η(lmin) ∗ x+ η ∗ vi
m ∗ (vi − x) ∼ η(lmin) ∗ (vi − x)
If x ≤ vi and η(lmin) ≤ m, then we conclude ∼ is ≥
Thus, we observe that delaying at lmin is better. The above discussion is for Player 1 but
can be easily adapted to Player 2. In a similar fashion, we can argue that delaying at lmin
till x ≤ v′i < vi is worse than delaying till x ≤ vi i.e; Player 1 prefers to wait until vi instead
of exiting and following gi at some point v′i < vi. J
G.1 OptCost Computation for All Constraints
In the computation in Algorithm 1, we have assumed that all the transitions from l e−→ l′ have
a guard 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. We shall now illustrate how to compute optcost of l if the guards on the
outgoing transitions are different.
While optimal strategies are possible with closed constraints, it is known that optimal
strategies need not exist with open constraints.
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Figure 14 Optcost Computation for guard 0 < x < 1
Constraints on all the outgoing edges are 0 < x < 1
We shall illustrate how to obtain −optimal strategies with open constraints. Consider the
Figure 14. Here the guard is 0 < x < 1 and clearly the OptCostG(l, 0) = 2 and there is no
strategy to achieve that. Hence we want to find the -optimal strategy achieving < 2 + .
Pick t = mmax+1 where mmax is the slope with the largest absolute value seen among the
outside cost functions. Here mmax = 3 (OptCost(A) is y = −3x + 3). Let  = 0.1. Then
t = 0.025. Now lets fix the strategy to wait at l till x < 1− t and go to A at x = 1− t4. Then
OptCostG(l, 0) = 2 ∗ (1− t) + f(1− t) where f given by y = −3x+ 3 is the optcost function
of A. Thus OptCostG(l, 0, 0) = 2.025 < 2 + 0.1. Extending this to several successors of l is
simple and follows all the steps of Algorithm 1. At 1− t, take the transition to the location
prescribed by f ′ in Step 4. Note that this method would work for 0 < x < 1 − δ by simply
replacing 1 with 1− δ in the discussion above.
Constraint 1− δ < x < 1
In transformation 1 from RPTG to dwell-time PTG, we replaced the constraintH < x < H+1
by H − δ < x < H + 1 − δ. Such a constraint would correspond in the resetfree FRPTG to
1 − δ < x < 1 or 0 ≤ x < 1 − δ. We have already dealt with the constraint 0 < x < 1 − δ.
Now, we shall highlight the difference to make it work for 1− δ < x < 1. We shall compute
as usual, by applying the steps of Algorithm1, and also get the prescribed strategy out of the
final function f ′. Now if the computed strategy σ for l suggests to take a transition in the
interval [0, 1− δ] then instead of this transition we prescribe waiting at l. This is because the
guard on the outgoing transition(s) is 1− δ < x < 1. The rest of the strategy prescribed by
f ′ over (1− δ, 1] is retained as is.
Constraints on outgoing edges are x = 0, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, x = 1
Figure 15 explains how to solve for optcost if the outgoing transitions have different guards.
As Player 1 can go to A only if x = 0, we need to consider only that point of OptCost(A)
while computing the optcost of l. Similarly, player 1 can go to C only when x = 1. Thus
the function to consider, for taking the transition to C is the cost of the path (or action) of
delaying in l till 0 ≤ x < 1 and going to C at x = 1. Upon reaching C at x = 1, the cost
incurred will be OptCost(C, 1) = 0.5. Delaying at l at the rate of η(l) = 2 yields a function
with slope −2 passing through the point (1, 0.5) (corresponding to going to C at x = 1).
4 If there are n transitions in the longest path from source to target then t = n∗(mmax+1) .
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Figure 15 Optcost Computation for different guards
H lmin is a player 2 location
Here we discuss in detail how to take care of the dwell-time requirements while running
Algorithm 1. Recall that there are three kinds of player 2 locations : urgent, those with
dwell-time requirements [0, δ] and those with dwell-time requirements [δ, 2δ].
1. Urgent location : superimpose and take exterior (only Steps 1 and 2).
2. [0, δ]-delay location : From Lemma 15, we know that Player 2 will want to spend as
much time as possible at a location lmin while keeping x ≤ vi whenever there is a function
gi over [ui, vi] whose slope is > −η(lmin). Note that we proved Lemma 15 for player 1,
however, an analogous result works when lmin is a player 2 location.
Thus, if lmin is entered at x = ν ∈ [ui, vi − δ], then player 2 spends δ time and exits
(as δ is the maximum delay permitted in lmin by the dwell-time restriction) at ν + δ to
the successor as prescribed by f at x = ν + δ. If lmin is entered at x = ν ∈ [vi − δ, vi],
then player 2 spends vi − ν at lmin and exits at vi to the successor as prescribed by f at
vi. In the superimposed optcost function f , a function gi : y = −mx + c having domain
[ui, vi] with slope less than −η(l) is replaced as follows : alter gi from y = −mx + c to
y = −m(x+ δ) + c+ η(l) ∗ δ = −mx+ c+ (η(l)−m) ∗ δ for x ∈ [ui, vi − δ]. Let us denote
the new function as hi over the domain [ui, vi − δ]. This corresponds to spending δ time
until x ≤ vi.
When x ∈ [vi − δ, vi], then Player 2 spends the time vi − x at lmin before proceeding, as
prescribed by f from vi onwards. Thus the function obtained by replacing gi for this range
[vi − δ, vi], h′i is y = −η(lmin)x + c′, and passes through the point (vi, f(vi)). However,
h′i should intersect with hi at vi − δ to make the resulting improved optcost function
continuous (and thus usable by the predecessors of lmin). We shall show that the line
passing through the two points (vi−δ, hi(vi−δ)) and (vi, f(vi)) has a slope −m′ = −η(l).
We have gi, the original cost function, and hi, and we know that from vi onwards, Player 2
has to continue with the optcost as dictated by f (the superimposed function). Thus we
know that from the point (vi−δ, hi(vi−δ)) of the new function hi, the optcost will proceed
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towards the point (vi, f(vi)) (recall that gi(vi) = f(vi)). Thus given these two points, we
find the line h′i = −m′x+ c′ as follows.
−m′ = f(vi)− hi(vi − δ)
vi − (vi − δ)
= [−m ∗ vi + c]− [−m(vi − δ) + c+ (η(l)−m) ∗ δ]
δ
= −η(l) ∗ δ
δ
= −η(l)
Similarly, we also find c′ by using h′i = −m′x + c′ where slope is −m′ = −η(l) and this
line passes through the point (vi, f(vi)).
f(vi) = −η(l) ∗ vi + c′
−m ∗ vi + c = −η(l) ∗ vi + c′
c′ = c+ (η(l)−m) ∗ vi
3. [δ, 2δ]−delay location : For every function gi in f (the superimposed function) of Step
2, we first apply the modification of always spending δ delay at lmin. This is achieved by
changing it from y = −mx+c to y = −m(x+δ)+c+η(l)∗δ. The domain of gi also changes
from [ui, vi] to [ui− δ, vi− δ]. Thus the entire superimposed function f has been modified
to f ′ (lets call it the adjusted superimposed function). After this, proceed with lmin
as though it were a [0, δ]-delay location while taking f ′ to be its adjusted superimposed
function.
H.1 Complexity and Termination when lmin is a player 2 location
Computing Almost Optimal Strategies: The strategy corresponding to computed optcost
when lmin is a player 2 location is derived as follows.
1. lmin is urgent. In this case, we simply do steps 1,2 of the algorithm, superimpose and
take exterior obtaining the function f . For x ∈ [uk, vk], the strategy will dictate moving
to location lk, since gk is the optcost function over the domain [uk, vk] of the successor lk
of lmin.
2. lmin is a [0, δ]-dwell time location. If x ∈ [ui, vi−δ] and the function is hi, the strategy will
prescribe waiting at lmin for δ amount of time and then proceed to li whose cost function
is gi, the one replaced by hi. If x ∈ [ui, vi− δ] and the function is gi (not replaced at Step
3), then the strategy suggests going immediately to li whose cost function is gi. Finally,
if x ∈ [vi − δ, vi] for functions h′i, we prescribe waiting at lmin till vi − x.
3. lmin is a [δ, 2δ]-dwell time location. The strategy prescribes waiting for δ time at lmin,
and then uses the strategy prescribed above for [0, δ]-dwell time locations.
We have already discussed the complexity of Algorithm 1 in computing the optcost func-
tion for lmin, and the almost optimal strategies when lmin is a player 1 location. Now we
discuss the case when lmin is a player 2 location.
Assume lmin is a player 2 location. Let α(m, p) denote the total number of affine segments
appearing in cost functions across all locations. We handle this case by making lmin urgent
and solve the modified PTG G′ (where lmin is urgent) which has one location less and then
uses the computed optcost functions as outside cost functions to solve for lmin itself. This can
be repeated as the optcost computed in G′ could get updated when the optcost cost of lmin
itself is computed. This process gets repeated as many times as the number of segments we
started with i.e p. Thus the equation is α(m, p) ≤ p.(1+α(m−1, p+1)) where α(m−1, p+1)
is the number of segments used for solving G′. 1 +α(m− 1, p+ 1) is the number of segments
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used for solving for lmin and p(1 + α(m− 1, p+ 1)) are the repetitions. Solving this, one can
easily check that α(m, p) is at most triply exponential in the number of locations m of the
resetfree component GF . Obtaining a bound of the number of affine segments, it is easy to
see that Algorithm 1 terminates; the time taken to compute almost optimal strategies and
optcost functions is triply exponential.
